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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In countless cities across the United States, emergency shelters and transitional
housing have been inadequate to meet the needs of a growing number of people experiencing
homelessness.1 Existing shelters and transitional housing often lack space to accommodate
the sheer number of people needing shelter, resulting in overcrowding inside and thousands of
people left to seek other options outside. Many people are excluded from shelters based on
gender identity, family makeup, criminal histories, or a lack of documented identification. Still
others avoid shelters based on past experiences of harassment, requirements to participate in
religious activities, or unsanitary conditions. As a result, shelters are often functionally
inaccessible to vast numbers of people experiencing homelessness. Because encampments can
pose many of these same barriers, they must do more than replicate the flaws of other shelter
systems if encampments are to be a meaningful alternative.
Several cities have implemented authorized encampments2 as interim shelter options
for people experiencing homelessness. An authorized encampment is a community of
unhoused people lawfully living outdoors on property owned by a city, university, church, or
other entity, and operated by a body with oversight capabilities and access to human service
providers. Each element can vary by encampment model—for example, some encampments
begin as unauthorized sites and later achieve permitted status by city ordinance. In those
instances, communities develop prior to the encampment becoming sanctioned by the city, as
opposed to communities created by application or by compulsory relocation. While the
specifics differ, each case study discussed herein shares four common features of authorized
encampments: (1) a community of unhoused people, (2) present by permission of the
landowner or local ordinance, (3) on land owned by someone else, (4) with formal operating
and governance structures aimed at maintaining the encampment and rehousing the
residents.
Encampments demonstrate several benefits for people experiencing homelessness:
•

Safety and Security. People living outdoors alone, in pairs, or in unauthorized
encampments are often subjected to “sweeps”: government action enforcing laws
that prohibit public camping. During sweeps, homeless people are forced to clear
out of the area and whatever belongings they cannot carry are often seized or

1

This brief will primarily refer to people experiencing homelessness using person-first language to emphasize that
homelessness is temporary experience, not an identity or status more significant than personhood. Common
terminology like “the homeless” and even “homeless people” can be dehumanizing, emphasizing one’s current
living arrangements as a person’s sole identity. With that concern in mind, this brief will refer to “people
experiencing homelessness,” “unhoused people,” and occasionally “homeless people” interchangeably when
necessary for sentence flow and clarity, with the intention that readers will understand that homelessness is an
experience shared by encampment residents, but it is not their sole identity.
2
Cities vary in terminology employed to describe authorized homeless encampments. This brief will at times refer
to “authorized,” “permitted” and “sanctioned,” and “tent cities” and “encampments” interchangeably, as
consistent with the terminology used in a given case study.
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destroyed. Besides disrupting the already chaotic life of an unhoused person,
sweeps can violate constitutional guarantees against unreasonable seizures,
punishment based on status, and due process. Beyond sweeps, people living on the
streets face harassment and even violence by police and passersby, creating a
pervasive and persistent sense of extreme uncertainty. Encampments can offer
some degree of safety and security for residents by virtue of enclosed spaces
patrolled by resident security teams, assurance that their belongings can remain in
a specific place all day, and certainty regarding where to sleep the next night.
•

Community. Homelessness can be an extremely isolating experience, and
chronically homeless people sometimes describe the experience as living on the
outskirts of society. Living in a community of people with shared experiences can
help to erode that stigma over time and create space for supportive relationshipbuilding.

•

Autonomy. As opposed to shelter environments with strict directives about when
to come and go and how to behave while inside, many encampments are governed
by group living agreements developed by residents themselves, allowing some
degree of self-determination for people to develop the rules by which they live. The
simple fact of having a private space (even if only a tent) to oneself and the freedom
to come and go as one chooses can have a dignity-restoring effect for people who
have experienced the dehumanizing conditions of shelters and living on the street.

•

Stability. Many housing-first models have demonstrated that providing safe,
consistent shelter can be a positive step for people dealing with chemical
dependency, mental illness, poor physical health, and other factors that contribute
to homelessness. Stable living arrangements can eliminate (or at least reduce) some
of the stress of being unhoused, allowing people to focus on rehabilitation.

•

Health. Sanctioned encampments offer additional benefits like efficient service
delivery to a centralized group of people. This centralization allows housing
navigators and other caseworkers to do their jobs more effectively than when
meeting with clients sporadically. Permitted encampments can also lessen health
care burdens when homeless people can live in sanitary conditions and see medical
professionals regularly, treating chronic illnesses and preventing the spread of
communicable diseases.

While many cities have explored authorized encampments as interim solutions to
homelessness, implementation has been haphazard because of the dearth of practical
guidance. Though each city surely must tailor its approach to the unique local needs, this brief
synthesizes some key issues that any city should consider prior to implementing a permitted
encampment:
•

Operations. Encampment governance can be managed by residents, outside
specialists, or some combination of the two groups. The governance structure
should be clear to all parties and reflect the values and objectives of the particular
encampment. Each party involved in operating the encampment—residents,
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operating partners, the landowner, and secondary partners like utility providers and
social service agencies—should be very clear about their respective duties in relation
to one another to minimize uncertainty and conflict. Further, the intended duration
for individual residents and for the location of the site will determine many
operational features (permanence of structures, necessity of internet and other
utilities, governance structure) and should therefore be identified at the outset.
•

Legal. Given that cities often authorize transitional encampments by ordinance,
legal considerations are crucial. For example, officials should carefully consider
zoning laws to allow for an appropriate number of encampments throughout the
municipality. Contracts between the landowner and encampment operator should
contemplate liability and indemnification. Finally, encampment rules and
regulations should be drafted and promulgated to ensure residents’ rights are
understood and respected.

•

Messaging. Any proposed authorized encampment will garner questions and
concerns from the public, and cities should be prepared to answer each inquiry with
candor. Public relations efforts should underscore benefits to public health and
public safety and dispel misconceptions about potential hazards associated with
encampments. Cities should also emphasize the potential for effective service
delivery via encampments, given that existing alternatives have not rehoused many
people in the community. And all messaging should clearly acknowledge that
authorized encampments are not themselves a solution to homelessness, cannot be
used to justify complacency or increased criminalization of homelessness, and must
be paired with continuing efforts towards permanent solutions.

This brief examines several case studies demonstrating common challenges and
opportunities posed by different encampment models: encampments hosted by universities,
operated by third-parties, self-governed, and compelling participation. Next, this brief
synthesizes the most important considerations any city should examine when developing a
plan for an authorized encampment. Finally, this brief concludes with overall
recommendations about how to effectively implement a permitted encampment to maximize
the utility of this interim approach to solving homelessness.
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Key Recommendations
1. Research how similar communities have enacted authorized
encampments. Many communities are opening sanctioned
encampments through a variety of approaches. Municipalities
should work together and share insights so that a new city
considering creating an authorized encampment can benefit from
prior experience .
2. Identify clear and specific goals. Is the goal of the encampment to
respond to a specific health crisis? To create an intentional
community? To create additional capacity for emergency
shelters? What subgroup of unhoused people is the target
population? The purpose of the encampment must be specific
because it will not only inform how to approach operations, legal
obligations, and messaging, but also how to measure success.
Incorporate the fundamental goals of the encampment into
evaluations of its effectiveness.
3. Approach those goals realistically and acknowledge their
shortcomings. Rehousing people experiencing homelessness
takes time, and cities should take care not to set unattainable
benchmarks. Cities should also resist overselling the merits of
sanctioned encampments because they can functionally exclude
people in many of the ways shelters do. Cities should not punish
individuals for whom authorized encampments are not a viable
option.
4. Set clear expectations and follow through consistently. Operations
will run more smoothly when all parties understand their own
responsibilities. Clear standards and procedures can also
minimize conflict within the encampment as well as between it
and the surrounding community.
5. Genuinely commit to whatever community structure has been
selected. The dynamics and priorities of the encampment may
change over time, as may community support for the endeavor.
Any alterations to rules or performance measures should be in
service to the encampment’s underlying mission.
7

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, communities across the country have experienced drastic increases in
the number of people experiencing homelessness, and existing low-income housing and
shelter facilities have been inadequate to meet the needs of the growing population.3 For
example, in King County, Washington, the most recent point-in-time count showed nearly
twelve thousand people experiencing homelessness in January 2017.4 Nearly half of the people
counted were left
unsheltered, once all the beds
were full in existing
emergency shelters.5 Of the
5,485 unsheltered people in
that county, most were
staying in vehicles, on the
street, or in tents.6 In addition
to the lack of space available
in emergency shelters and
transitional housing
programs, these options are
often functionally
inaccessible for many people
experiencing homelessness.7
Nearly half of the people experiencing homelessness in King County
As a result, many unhoused
are unsheltered, according to the 2017 point-in-time count.3
people have begun living in

3

See, e.g., ALL HOME, COUNT US IN: SEATTLE/KING COUNTY POINT-IN-TIME COUNT OF PERSONS EXPERIENCING
HOMELESSNESS 8 (2017) http://allhomekc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2017-King-PIT-Count-ComprehensiveReport-FINAL-DRAFT-5.31.17.pdf [hereinafter, COUNT US IN] (illustrating that of the nearly twelve thousand
people experiencing homelessness in King county, 5,485 were left unsheltered, according to that county’s most
recent point-in-time count). See also, NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, HOMELESSNESS IN
AMERICA: OVERVIEW OF DATA AND CAUSES (2015), https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Homeless_Stats_Fact_Sheet
(presenting data demonstrating significant increases in homelessness since the 2008 economic recession).
4
All Home, HOMELESSNESS IN KING COUNTY, (JAN. 27, 2017) http://allhomekc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017Count-Us-In-Infographic.pdf. It should be noted that point-in-time counts assuredly underestimate the actual
number of unhoused people because such data is difficult to collect. See Sara Rankin, The Influence of Exile, 76 MD.
L. REV. 4, 44 n. 227 (2016); Paul Boden, Homeless Head Counts Help No One, SF GATE (Feb. 5, 2013),
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/Homeless-head-counts-helpno-one-4254191.php ("At best,
this method is an elementary and ineffective way to determine how many people exist without housing.").
5
COUNT US IN, supra note 3.
6
Id.
7
For example, shelter rules requiring identification, excluding people with criminal records, or dividing families
based on gender can have the effect of excluding people from the outset. Others avoid shelters because of unsafe
or unsanitary conditions, or policies that discriminate against gay, lesbian, and trans individuals. For more
information on barriers to accessing shelters, see Suzanne Skinner, Seattle University Homeless Rights Advocacy
Project, SHUT OUT: HOW BARRIERS OFTEN PREVENT MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO EMERGENCY SHELTER (Sara Rankin, ed.,
2016).
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outdoor communities, or homeless encampments, for safety in numbers and other group
support mechanisms.8
An authorized encampment is a community of unhoused people lawfully living
outdoors on property owned by a city, church, or university, often operated by some
combination of camp residents and partner organizations with human services expertise.9
Cities, churches, and other entities have explored authorized encampments as interim
solutions to homelessness for at least the past ten years but have often done so haphazardly
because guidance on how best to pursue them is wanting.

In communities that lack sufficient
shelter, authorized encampments
can offer safer, more stable
temporary living arrangements
than other alternatives.11

Authorized encampments are not themselves
permanent solutions to homelessness.10 But,
in communities that lack sufficient shelter and
affordable housing, authorized encampments
can offer safer, more stable temporary living
environments than other alternatives such as
living alone or in pairs in other public spaces.11

8

See Samir Junejo, Seattle University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, NO REST FOR THE WEARY: WHY CITIES
SHOULD EMBRACE HOMELESS ENCAMPMENTS (Sara Rankin & Susanne Skinner eds., 2016).
9
City of Seattle, City-Sanctioned Encampments, HOMELESSNESS RESPONSE,
https://www.seattle.gov/homelessness/sanctioned-encampments [hereinafter Seattle City-Sanctioned
Encampments]; Zachary Clark, How Pacific Northwest Cities Have Made Space for Homeless Encampments, SAN
FRANCISCO PUBLIC PRESS (Mar. 3, 2017), http://sfpublicpress.org/news/2017-03/how-northwest-cities-have-madespace-for-homeless-encampments.
10
Nor do homeless rights advocates uniformly embrace homeless encampments as a means to address
homelessness. For example, consultant Barbara Poppe, who was hired to develop Seattle’s plan to address
homelessness in 2016, described encampments as “a real distraction from investing in solutions.” Daniel
Beekman, Stop Opening Tent Cities, Homelessness Expert Tells Seattle Leaders, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 26, 2016),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/stop-opening-tent-cities-homelessness-expert-tells-seattleleaders/. See also United States Interagency Council on Homelessness, Ending Homelessness for People in
Encampments: Advancing the Dialogue 2 (2015) (expressing concern that costly homeless encampment
operations can prevent funding from going directly to permanent housing and “distract communities from
focusing on” permanent solutions); J. D. Morris, Sonoma County to Shut Down Roseland Homeless Encampments,
Connect Residents with Services, THE PRESS DEMOCRAT (Feb. 25, 2018) (“Activists are trying to secure another Santa
Rosa location for an authorized encampment, but the idea faces resistance from city policymakers who view it as
out of step with their focus on getting homeless people into shelter or long-term housing.”),
http://www.pressdemocrat.com/news/8020042-181/sonoma-county-to-shut-down; but see generally Junejo, supra
note 8. Other homeless rights advocates have cautioned overselling authorized encampments as solutions to
homelessness, criticizing “reclassif[ication] of those living in sanctioned encampments as residing in emergency
shelter” for the purposes of a point-in-time count as “useless legerdemain . . . trickery, cunning, artifice, deceit
and deception . . . rebrand itself, calculated to reassure us of progress while the homeless crisis steadily deepens
and more people die year after year.” Tim Harris, Director’s Corner: “Without Shelter, People Die" Isn’t Just a
Hyperbolic Slogan, REAL CHANGE NEWS (Aug. 2, 2017).
11
Telephone Interview with Paul Boden, Executive and Organizing Director, Western Regional Advocacy Project
(October 31, 2017). Because “theft, sweeps, and loss of property are a part of life for homeless folks,” it is a vast
improvement for an authorized encampment resident to be able to leave for the day, certain that his belongings
will still be there when he returns. Hanna Brooks Olson, Access Denied: What Happens When Barriers are Lifted,

9

Unfortunately, traditional shelter and transitional housing services in many cities
cannot meet the needs of their local homeless population due to insufficient funding, barriers
to entry, inadequate protections or services, or some combination of the above.12 And, in the
absence of long-term solutions to homelessness and the affordable housing crisis, “homeless
people need a place to sleep, shelter themselves, and store belongings.”13 Authorized
encampments provide an alternative temporary living environment with some safety and
security14 and a sense of community15 and, potentially, efficient access to supportive services
to help residents transition into permanent housing.16 Centralizing a group of unhoused people
together also allows for more efficient service delivery for basic needs like food, running water,
and restrooms. Although homeless
encampments are not a new
invention,17 sanctioned encampments
are a relatively recent trend,18
representing many cities’
legitimization of this interim option
for people experiencing
homelessness, making it easier for
people living in these environments to
re-establish a sense of selfdetermination and stability crucial to
National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty13
becoming rehoused.

REAL CHANGE NEWS (June 28, 2017), http://realchangenews.org/2017/06/28/access-denied-what-happens-whenbarriers-are-lifted [hereinafter Olson, Access Denied].
12
Julie Hunter, Paul Linden-Retek, Sirine Shebaya, and Samuel Halpert, National Law Center on Homelessness
and Poverty, WELCOME HOME: THE RISE OF TENT CITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (Hope Metcalf, Eric Tars, Heather
Maria Johnson eds., 2014); Junejo, supra note 8 at 3; Skinner, supra note 7.
13
NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, HOMELESSNESS, TENT CITY USA 12 (2017),
https://www.nlchp.org/Tent_City_USA_2017 [hereinafter TENT CITY USA].
14
Unhoused people are often subjected to laws that prohibit public camping and criminalize engaging in basic lifesustaining activities like sitting, standing, sleeping, urination, and defection in public places. See Justin Olson &
Scott MacDonald, Seattle University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, WASHINGTON’S WAR ON THE VISIBLY POOR:
A SURVEY OF CRIMINALIZING ORDINANCES AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT (Sara Rankin, ed., 2015). Cities often “sweep”
unauthorized encampments instead of or in addition to citing people for public camping, forcing people to move,
and often seizing and destroying whatever belongings the individuals are unable to carry with them. See Junejo,
supra note 8 at 15–21. One of the major benefits authorized encampments can offer is the guarantee that one can
return to the same place to sleep night after night and that one’s belongings can remain secure there.
15
Gretchen Schultz, Vendor Profile: Dennis, REAL CHANGE (Mar. 7, 2018),
http://www.realchangenews.org/2018/03/07/vendor-profile-dennis. ("'Anybody could become homeless. But they
shouldn’t stay there. I just hate to see the people laying and sleeping on the sidewalk. The tent city was a big step
up from that itself, just being an organized group. And that must be because I like being around other
people . . . It’d be nice if Seattle sanctioned more urban encampments like that.'")
16
Olson, Access Denied, supra note 11.
17
See TENT CITY USA, supra note 13 at 7 (noting a 1,342% increase in “unique homeless encampments reported in
the media” from 2007 to 2016).
18
Only 4% of encampments are legal. Id.
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Operational structures for encampments
can vary. Some permitted encampments have
evolved from unauthorized communities that
form group living agreements while
unsanctioned (herein called “organically-seeded
encampments”); these communities often have
the desire and capacity to self-manage many of
their operations once they achieve permitted
status.19 Operating partners for such
encampments might be less involved in the dayto-day operations or decision-making, but could
facilitate secondary partnerships with utilities,
waste management, housing navigators, or
other service providers.

This brief compares a variety of
encampment models:
• Encampments hosted by
universities;
• Encampments operated by
third-party entities;
• Self-governed
encampments; and
• Compulsory encampments.

Other permitted encampments have been formed after a city has designated an
authorized encampment site, and thus require a partner organization to actually operate the
site, managing logistics as well as enforcing rules and regulations (herein called “officiallyseeded encampments”).20 Officially-seeded encampments have been criticized by advocates
concerned about cities authorizing encampments as repositories for people getting swept
from their unauthorized camping sites, forcing relocation rather than allowing people to live in
encampments by choice; this approach defeats the purpose of preserving autonomy in
authorized encampments.21 However, organically-seeded encampments may be especially
vulnerable to problems with oversight or inadequate supportive services.22 Any encampment
engaging residents in its governance or management faces a difficult tension: it must retain
strong, experienced leaders within the community, but its ultimate goal is to move those
individuals into permanent housing, thereby removing the strongest candidates from selfgovernance roles.23
This brief centralizes best practices developed by some host sites, operating partners,
encampment leadership, and governmental actors on the West Coast, given the alarming
increase in homelessness in this part of the country since 2015.24 Part I examines several case
studies selected for variety and comparison of different encampment models: encampments
19

See, i.e., Dignity Village and Camp Second Chance, infra Part I(C).
See, i.e., San Diego, Cal. and Tacoma, Wash., infra Part I(D).
21
Interview with Paul Boden, supra note 11; Telephone Interview with David Baum, Community Advocate
(October 24, 2017).
22
Telephone Interview with Polly Trout, Executive Director, Patacara Community Services (October 12, 2017);
Telephone Interview with Krystal Koop, Community Advocate (November 2, 2017).
23
Interview with Polly Trout, supra note 22.
24
Christopher Weber and Geoff Mulvihill, America’s Homeless Population Rises for First Time in Years, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/47662ad74baf4bb09f40619e4fd25a94. While the national
homeless population increased by about 1 percent since 2016—the first increase since 2010—increases have been
generally much higher in West Coast cities like Seattle and Los Angeles. Notably, the number of unsheltered
people has risen disproportionately faster than compared to the number of people experiencing homelessness
overall. Id.
20
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hosted by universities, encampments operated by third-party entities, self-governed
encampments, and compulsory encampments. The selected case studies are by no means
exhaustive but represent a range of operational approaches that demonstrate some of the
most significant hurdles and advantages of encampments.
Based on insights gleaned from the case studies, Parts II-IV discuss significant
opportunities and challenges that should be considered by any city or entity planning to
implement an authorized encampment. Part II details operational issues like duration and
delegating duties. Part III discusses legal issues including liability and residents’ rights. Part IV
outlines the major points for messaging or public relations efforts, like the benefits of public
health and safety, efficiency, and community enrichment. The brief concludes with general
observations and critical recommendations for advocates of permitted encampments.

I. Case Studies
The following case studies demonstrate a variety of operational, legal, and social
challenges and opportunities evident in authorized encampments in Seattle, Washington;
Tacoma, Washington; Portland, Oregon; and San Diego, California. Although each
encampment is unique, the selected sites can be broadly categorized based on their most
significant distinguishing features. First, encampments hosted by universities pose unique
opportunities for community engagement—both with pedagogical opportunities and with
additional stakeholders to address in any messaging efforts. Second, encampments operated
by a third-party entity (other than the landowner or encampment residents themselves) enjoy
valuable expertise and oversight, but at the cost of removing some degree of autonomy from
the encampment residents. Third, self-governed encampments emphasize dignity and selfdetermination by vesting decision-making power in the encampment residents, but they are
vulnerable to unethical leadership and uncertain processes. Finally, encampments compelling
participation in response to public health emergencies represent a locality’s recognition of the
health risks associated with homelessness, but can force people experiencing homelessness
into compulsory participation without meaningful alternatives.

A. University Hosts
Tent City 3 (TC3) has operated in different locations as a “democratically self-governed
encampment offering tent shelter and community solidarity” since 2000.25 TC3 operates under
the umbrella organization Seattle Housing and Resource Effort (SHARE), a grassroots coalition
of homeless and formerly homeless individuals working together to “eradicate homelessness,
educate the community, and empower homeless people."26 Each of the major four-year
universities in Seattle has hosted TC3 at least once: Seattle University in February 2005;
Seattle Pacific University in winter 2012–2013, 2015–2016, and 2017–2018; and University of
25

Jessica Bielenberg, et al., University of Washington School of Public Health, TC3@UW: EVALUATION REPORT
WINTER 2017 3 (Mar. 9, 2017) [hereinafter TC3@UW] (on file with author).
26
About Us, SEATTLE HOUSING AND RESOURCE EFFORT/WOMEN’S HOUSING EQUALITY AND ENHANCEMENT LEAGUE,
http://www.sharewheel.org/aboutus. SHARE’s objectives include increasing visibility of homeless people in order
to educate the community about the realities of homelessness. To that end, the organization devised a system of
rotating tent city locations every 90 days to bring awareness to various neighborhoods around Seattle. Id.
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Washington in winter 2016–2017. Churches typically host TC3 for ninety-day periods when the
encampment is not located at a university.27 Students were the primary force pushing for each
university to host TC3.28
In each instance that TC3 and universities agreed to partner together, the entities
detailed their respective responsibilities in a memorandum of understanding (MOU). Critical
provisions included dates of operation, respective obligations for each entity, joint
commitments, early termination rights, denying access to campus for TC3 participants or
SHARE/WHEEL representatives who do not comply with the agreement, and survival of
obligations.29 Obligations of the host university included permitting use of facilities and
utilities (space, water, fencing, electricity, garbage and recycling services), specific vehicle
access points, and indemnification from third party suits for injury or damage caused by
negligence of SPU representatives.30 SHARE/WHEEL’s obligations included ensuring secure
checkpoints staffed by TC3 residents, construction and maintenance, enforcing the TC3 Code
of Conduct, responsibility for damages, insurance coverage, and indemnification from third
party suits for injury, damage, or loss caused by TC3 and SHARE/WHEEL representatives.31
Besides the challenges and benefits associated with operating an authorized
encampment on city land, university hosts must consider other obstacles and opportunities
inherent to the institutions. For example, universities face additional constituent groups for
public relations beyond the neighborhood residents and nearby businesses. Students, parents,
alumni, faculty, and staff all have an interest in a university’s decision to host a homeless
encampment; taxpayers also
constitute stakeholders in a
public university. Universities’
pedagogical roles also present
opportunities and potential
pitfalls. Students can gain
practical experience in the fields
of medicine, law, and sociology
by working directly with
encampment residents.
However, universities should
Photo credit: Seattle Pacific University.28
scrutinize whether they are
27

For scoping purposes, this brief does not address considerations unique to encampments hosted by faith-based
entities. For information on religious land use and homeless services, see Kate Means, Seattle University
Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, FAITH IS THE FIRST STEP: FAITH-BASED SOLUTIONS TO HOMELESSNESS (Sara Rankin
ed., 2018).
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Telephone Interview with Joe Orlando, Director of the Center for Jesuit Education, Seattle University
(September 28, 2017); Ana Marie Cauce, UW to Host Tent City 3 for 90 Days in Winter 2017, UNIVERSITY OF
WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (June 8, 2016), http://www.washington.edu/president/2016/06/08/uw-tohost-tent-city-3-for-90-days-in-winter-2017/; About SPU’s Homeless Initiative, ENGAGING HOMELESSNESS,
http://spu.edu/engaging-homelessness/about.
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Id.
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asking too much of encampment residents by putting them in the role of teachers. Likewise,
residents of the encampments should carefully consider how this educational experience could
be structured to be beneficial to the encampment residents themselves.32
The university-hosted case studies that follow demonstrate several benefits and
obstacles associated with situating authorized encampments in a collegiate environment.
While each university took different approaches to bringing TC3 to its campus, all shared
common considerations: persuading their constituencies to allow the partnership, deciding on
location and duration of the stay, determining legal obligations and operational duties, and
designing educational opportunities. Overall, the universities and encampment residents
found that the partnerships had humanizing and community-building effects.
1. Seattle University
Dates of Operation

February 2005 (one month)

Capacity

60–80 people

Location

Tennis courts, southeast corner of campus

Seattle University (SU) was the first university in the country to host a tent
encampment when it invited TC3 to campus in February 2005.33 Students in the university’s
graduate program in Educational Leadership studied tent cities and saw an opportunity for the
school’s educational programming to intersect with its Jesuit mission by hosting a tent city on
campus.34 Over several months, the university and the leadership of TC3 planned and
negotiated location, duration, and the utilities and services the school would provide.35
As the university-encampment partnership was such a new innovation, the parties
agreed to a stay lasting one month. A court order allowed private entities to host homeless
encampments for a maximum of 90 days, and the TC3 leadership felt that moving was such a
considerable undertaking, it would only be worthwhile if they could stay for at least a month in
the new location.36 TC3 was set up on the school’s tennis courts because encampment
leadership had emphasized the importance of hard surfaces (less mud during Seattle’s rainy
winter months) and fencing (for the residents’ safety).37 The tennis courts also had the
advantage of lighting—the school kept the lights on later than they would for the courts’

32

See TC3@UW, infra note 107 (recommending designing classes specifically for the benefit of encampment
residents, like resume writing or job interviewing, during TC3’s next stay at University of Washington).
33
Interview with Joe Orlando, supra note 28. See also Tan Vinh, Homeless Set Up Camp Near Seattle University
Campus, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 30, 2005, updated Jan. 29, 2005), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/homeless-set-up-camp-near-seattle-university-campus/.
34
Interview with Joe Orlando, supra note 28. In fact, religious organizations have a long history of providing
services for homeless people, including hosting encampments. See Means, supra note 27.
35
Interview with Joe Orlando, supra note 28.
36
Id. As university hosting was experimental, SU was careful not to “bite off more than it could chew,” and agreed
to host for one month. Id.
37
Id.
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regular athletic use, and the residents appreciated the visibility.38 Ultimately, “the residents [of
TC3] just wanted space. Everything else [the university provided] was gravy: electricity, water,
meals.”39 The university considered offering other amenities—like showers, library access,
even classes for residents—but eventually decided against these extras, careful not to
overextend themselves.40
TC3 and University leadership structured an
integrated relationship for students and residents.
“The residents were often
Seattle University arranged for three categories of
in the role of educators.
connections between TC3 residents and the university
Students came to see
community: educational, community-building, and
people as people.”43
service.41 Educational connections included class tours
of the camp (within hours and numbers set by camp
residents) and panels of speakers discussing their experiences with homelessness.42
Community-building activities like game nights and a Super Bowl viewing party had a
humanizing effect and allowed students and residents to build authentic relationships. 43 The
hosting relationship also included a service component: nursing and legal clinics with graduate
students in those programs, meals provided by the university’s dining services, and fundraising
from the local community to cover moving costs like trucks and portable toilets.44 The
university’s facilities department even hired a few TC3 residents for temporary jobs, putting a
little money in the residents’ pockets and providing an employer reference for the future.45
The effort was preceded by public relations efforts and messaging to the university’s
constituents. Prior to hosting, Seattle University sent letters out to parents, students, and
alumni, explaining the plan to host and outlining accountability structures to quell concerns.46
The overwhelming response was positive—people felt it was a good thing for the university to
host a homeless encampment and they were glad to hear it was happening.47 Negative
responses were few, but vehement.48 Negative reactions ranged from alumni pledging never
to donate another dollar to the university, parents threatening to “sue if their daughter got
raped by a resident,” and students complaining of being deprived of a tennis court paid for by
their tuition.49 The university realized that people did not respond well to efforts trying to
convince them they were wrong or their concerns were misguided. Rather, detractors were

38

The sun sets between 5 and 6 p.m. in Seattle in February. SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, USA—SUNRISE, SUNSET, AND
DAYLENGTH, FEBRUARY 2005, https://www.timeanddate.com/sun/usa/seattle?month=2&year=2005.
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more satisfied when SU simply provided them with the public safety plan and a description of
how the university planned to address concerns.50
Similarly, the university notified residents of
the neighborhood surrounding the university of the
Seattle studies suggest there
plan to host.51 The nearby Baptist Church on Cherry
is no significant increase in
Street had hosted homeless encampments, so many
crime associated with
neighbors were already somewhat familiar with the
authorized encampments.56
concept.52 Their responses were mostly genuine
inquiries about implementation, including duration,
who was in charge of security, and what would happen if there was trouble.53 Some members
of the business community were not happy about the university’s choice and felt that the
school was “bringing an unruly element to the neighborhood unnecessarily.”54 But these
concerns proved to be unfounded. No significant “unruly” incidents were associated with the
encampment’s presence at the university.55 This outcome is apparently not unique: the most
recent evaluation of permanent encampments in Seattle notes that the Seattle Police
Department collected data on crime levels around permitted encampments that show these
encampments are not associated with any significant increase in crime.56
2. Seattle Pacific University
Dates of
Operation

January–March 2012
December 2014–March 2015
November 2017–February 2018

Capacity

60–80 people

Location

Soccer field, northeast edge of campus
Grassy area in the middle of the central vehicle entrance to campus
Parking lot, north campus

Seattle Pacific University (SPU) has hosted TC3 several times, allowing university and
camp coordinators to develop curriculum, streamline operations, and build lasting

50

Id.
Id.
52
Interview with Joe Orlando, supra note 28; see Means, supra note 27.
53
Interview with Joe Orlando, supra note 28.
54
Id.
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Id.
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CITY OF SEATTLE, Permitted Encampment Evaluation 10 (June 28, 2017),
http://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/HumanServices/AboutUs/Final%202017%20Permitted%20Enc
ampment%20Evaluation.pdf [hereinafter Permitted Encampment Evaluation].
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relationships.57 SPU hosted for the first time in winter of 2012, again in 2015 and for the third
time in winter 2017–2018.58
Over time, SPU learned how the
2017–2018:
2012:
location of the encampment relative to
Visitor Parking Lot
Wallace Field
the rest of campus affected the
relationships between students and
encampment residents. The first time
the university hosted the encampment,
it was located on a soccer field near the
edge of campus.59 Though many
students engaged with encampment
residents, interaction was selective and
the location at the edge of campus made
it easy for many students to completely
avoid TC3.60 The second time SPU
hosted, it located the encampment in
2015:
the university’s Tiffany Loop, near the
Tiffany Loop
student union and several academic
buildings. This more central location
allowed students to engage with the
encampment more frequently.61 The
third time SPU hosted TC3, it was
Map: Seattle Pacific University59
situated on a central visitor parking lot,
surrounded by the university bookstore, academic buildings, university mailing and copying
services, and the Center for Applied Learning connected to the School of Business,
Government, and Economics.62
Each time SPU has hosted, it has done so for three months, as per SHARE/WHEEL’s
operational model.63 Although a Seattle city ordinance now allows authorized encampments
to stay at a permitted location for a year or more,64 TC3 continues to adhere to its older ninetyday rule. This timeframe may have made more sense back in 2012 when the objective was to
57

Telephone Interview with Niki Amarantides, Director of the Center for Learning, Seattle Pacific University
(October 6, 2017); Jennifer McKinney & Karen Snedker, From Charity to Change, 15 CONTEXTS 2 at 80, 81 (2016)
[hereinafter From Charity to Change]. SPU has also developed general guidance for hosting an authorized
encampment. Hosting a Tent Encampment, SEATTLE PACIFIC UNIVERSITY, http://spu.edu/engaginghomelessness/hosting-a-tent-encampment.
58
Interview with Niki Amarantides, supra note 57; Mike Wold, SPU Students Earn an A From Tent City Residents,
REAL CHANGE NEWS (Mar. 14, 2012), http://realchangenews.org/2012/03/14/spu-students-earn-tent-city-residents.
59
Campus Map, SEATTLE PACIFIC UNIVERSITY, http://spu.edu/info/maps/index.asp.
60
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Frequently Asked Questions, SEATTLE HOUSING AND RESOURCE EFFORT/WOMEN’S HOUSING EQUALITY AND
ENHANCEMENT LEAGUE, http://www.sharewheel.org/tent-city-f-a-q-s.
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SEATTLE, WASH., LAND USE CODE § 23.42.056(E) (2015).
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make tent cities more visible with exposure to as many neighborhoods as possible.65 Since
homelessness has come to the forefront of public attention in Seattle, some advocates have
questioned whether frequent tent city moves create more benefits or burdens.66 The shorter
duration suits the university’s interest because it allows for the pedagogical and philosophical
benefits of hosting while limiting the university’s expenses.67 The university host model also
alleviates some of the burden of the frequent moves, as SPU garnered significant support from
student and community volunteers to assist with load-in and load-out days.68
As an operating partner,
SHARE/WHEEL provided a meal
calendar,69 brought in a free
dental service van, and oversaw
inspections with the fire and
health department.70 TC3
residents who had engineering
and layout skills worked with SPU
facilities to map out waste water,
power, and Wi-Fi.71
Timing was one of the
most crucial considerations for
SPU’s hosting of TC3.72 Like the
other universities, each time SPU
Photo: Seattle Pacific University68
hosted, it did so during winter
months, when the encampment residents most needed a stable place to stay. 73 As a large
institution, the university absorbed the burden of bringing people inside a university building
during extreme winter temperatures, wind, and rain.74 The university also needed sufficient
time to plan and inform their neighbors of the intended land use change, obtain necessary
permits, develop a memorandum of understanding, and publicize the plans to students and
65

Interview with Niki Amarantides, supra note 57.
Id.
67
Id. Of course, there are costs associated with brief hosting periods as well; for example, moving costs like trucks,
tools, and meals for volunteers can add up with frequent moves. Id.
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Mike Wold, SPU students Earn an A From Tent City 3 Residents, REAL CHANGE NEWS (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://realchangenews.org/2012/03/14/spu-students-earn-tent-city-residents; Julia Siemens, City Without Walls:
Students and Tent City Residents Share Campus Life, SEATTLE PACIFIC UNIVERSITY RESPONSE,
http://spu.edu/depts/uc/response/new/2012-spring/the-city/city-without-walls.asp.
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Community groups can view the public calendar to see which meals have already been accounted for, then
contact SHARE/WHEEL to sign up to provide a meal on a particular day: Tent City 3, SEATTLE HOUSING AND
RESOURCE EFFORT/WOMEN’S HOUSING EQUALITY AND ENHANCEMENT LEAGUE, http://www.sharewheel.org/tent-city-3.
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parents.75 Winter was the best option for both the university and for TC3 because it allowed
time for planning and outreach while maximizing the benefit for the residents.
Persuading constituents to support the partnership became easier after the first time
SPU successfully hosted TC3. By the time SPU was considering hosting TC3 for a second time
in 2012, a new President had joined the university and embraced the notion of hosting an
encampment as “part of the SPU brand,” even including hosting homeless encampments as
part of its “core theme” of Christian identity and purpose in the university’s strategic plan.76
The university President’s enthusiasm for hosting meant funding and support for a standing
Committee on Homelessness to plan for each instance of hosting.77 This effort framed the act
of hosting as more than charity, instead grounding it in the university’s theological heritage.78
Prior to the arrival of TC3 on campus, SPU sent out
informational emails to students and parents anticipating the
most pressing questions:
•
•
•
•

Encampments can
be “a remarkable
living classroom."76

Where the encampment would be located;
How long the encampment would stay;
How hosting the encampment posed opportunities for
deeper engagement with the university’s pedagogical and Christian values;
TC3’s self-governance policies and how it, SHARE/WHEEL, and the university planned
to address safety issues.79

SPU also offered several opportunities for students, parents, faculty, and the public to join the
conversation and learn more about TC3 and homelessness, such as breakout sessions and film
events as part of its Annual Day of Common Learning.80
Although the SPU administration was skeptical about hosting the encampment the first
time, a group of persistent students urged the school to consider it seriously.81 At the request
of these students, SPU agreed to host. Dr. Snedker offered its first sociology seminar on
homelessness in 2011 in anticipation of hosting the encampment, and now offers courses on
issues around homelessness every year.82 In hosting years, Dr. Snedker also offered an advance
seminar course, approaching homelessness from a service-learning perspective and
incorporating research methodology skills and genuine relationship building.83 SPU also found
75

Id.
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that besides the academic skills students developed by participating in the course, many
experienced their own “personal transformations” because of their engagement with the
residents of TC3.84
3. University of Washington
Dates of Operation

December 2016–March 2017

Capacity

60–80 people

Location

Parking lot, southwest edge of campus

Several groups of professors and students unsuccessfully petitioned UW administration
to host a tent city in 2006 and again in 2009.85 Eventually, a group called “Tent City Collective”
(The Collective)—comprised of students, alumni, and TC3 residents—registered as a student
organization, gathered community support, and developed a proposal for hosting, which the
university finally accepted.86 Even then, it took several years of planning and community
outreach before the university was ready to host TC3 for the 2017 winter quarter.87 Given
university populations, this timeframe meant that many of the student leaders who had
initiated The Collective had graduated by the time their goal came to fruition.88 The older
students recruited underclassmen to take responsibility for The Collective’s efforts to keep the
group’s momentum going.89
While at UW, TC3 was located on parking lot W35, situated near the southwest corner
of campus. 90 It was adjacent to the university’s School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences, School
of Marine and Environmental Affairs, and Joint Institute for the Study of the Atmosphere and
Ocean.91 While some students and TC3 residents felt that the location was too remote for
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From Charity to Change, supra note 57, at 81. For example, students reported changes in their “everyday
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much community interaction, other
students and residents felt that the
location was actually too highly
trafficked by students.92

Other than the land, the
university’s most vital contributions
were water and electricity.93 Though the
university offered other services like WiFi, showers, and class audits, these
resources were generally underutilized
because access was “inconvenient and
unclear” and somewhat out of line with
Map: University of Washington90
the priorities of the encampment
residents.94 For example, the university made the Waterfront Activity Center available to TC3
residents, but only about a third of residents utilized that space, even when extreme winter
weather made outdoor conditions even more dangerous than typical.95 Instead, many
residents chose more private arrangements: some went to emergency shelters, a few received
emergency motel vouchers, and others found places to “couch surf” until the storm passed.96
UW and The Collective made significant efforts to engage students with TC3 residents
and issues surrounding homelessness during TC3’s stay at the university. The school offered
eight academic courses related to homelessness during the quarter it hosted, ranging from a
“Health and Homelessness” course in the School of Dentistry to a “Housing and Social Policy”
course in the School of Public Policy and a “Social Issues Composition” course in the English
Department.97 The university also hosted non-academic community-building events like game
nights and potlucks.98 Yet, many TC3 residents reported that they felt “the stigma of being
homeless . . . followed them wherever they [went],” including the UW campus.99 This feeling
was likely due, at least in part, to the size of the student body and the reality that some
students were not well-informed about or even aware of the policies behind TC3’s presence at
UW.100
92
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As a public institution of higher learning,
UW felt an intense duty to remain transparent and
open to community feedback throughout the
planning process and during its time as host of
TC3.101 This effort included building a robust page
on the university website, inviting feedback via
email and at town-hall meetings, and publishing
the encampment safety regulations and
Memorandum of Understanding online.102

As a public institution, UW’s
expenditures were a matter of
taxpayer concern: “There
were a lot of people who
believe they know how public
resources should be used."101

Besides fostering robust learning opportunities and deepening community
engagement, UW felt that hosting the encampment was a positive move for its reputation.103 It
was the first public university in the country to host a homeless encampment, which garnered
a great deal of media attention.104 As the university is often seen as a behemoth, this attention
helped to cast light on UW’s role as a good neighbor doing its part to support unhoused people
in Seattle.105
Importantly, one of the academic courses connected to the encampment was a
program evaluation course in the university's public health graduate program. The course
surveyed and interviewed UW community members (students, faculty, staff, and
administration), TC3 residents, and local businesses and organizations.106 The evaluation found
that the community would support another opportunity to host TC3 and made several
recommendations to improve the
experience of all parties, largely focusing
"Students remained engaged and
on centralizing the needs and desires of
have done tremendous work, in
TC3 residents and investing in and
addition to their class loads, in order
acknowledging the efforts made by
105
residents, students, and other
to make the stay a success.”
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volunteers.107 Given the results of the evaluation, the university may consider hosting an
encampment again in future, “contingent on having the same level of student engagement.”108
4. Summary of Challenges & Opportunities
Universities present several unique environmental attributes relevant to hosting an
encampment. First, universities provide an additional layer of constituency for public relations.
All permitted encampments should conduct outreach to neighbors and nearby businesses to
explain how the encampment will be operated, what purposes it will serve, and how its
leadership intends to respond to concerns raised by the outside community. However,
universities answer to additional stakeholders: students, parents, alumni, faculty, and staff—all
of whom have an interest in how the institution is operated, how its funds are spent, and who is
permitted on campus.109
Second, a university’s educational purpose can be integrated into the effort to host the
encampment. Each university in Seattle that hosted TC3 developed curriculum around the
encampment, creating practical service-learning opportunities for students in sociology,
nursing, and legal programs. These courses allow students to learn from real patients and
clients and to see the results of their efforts in person. Perhaps more important, students that
directly engaged with encampment residents
reported transformational experiences: face“[W]e witnessed students so
to-face interactions with encampment
impacted by the experience that
residents created opportunities for those
everyday conversations with
students to challenge their own preconceptions
their friends, family members,
about homelessness, and many students
shared their new understandings with other
and coworkers changed.”110
110
people in their lives.
In the university context, the opportunities and challenges relating to hosting a
permitted encampment look like counterweights. The additional layer of constituents presents
107
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opportunities to connect with the local community (and beyond), but also means that the
university must be prepared to answer those constituent concerns. And while the pedagogical
opportunities can be both practical and transformational, they also risk appropriating the
experiences of encampment residents. Universities must be careful about putting
encampment residents in the position of teachers and respect the wishes of the campers.
Likewise, encampments and universities considering partnership should work together to
develop curriculum not only enlightening to the students, but also beneficial to the
encampment residents themselves.
Opportunities

Challenges

•

The additional layer of
constituents in the
university context presents
numerous opportunities to
connect with the local
community.

•

The university must also be prepared to answer
those constituent concerns because
stakeholders like students, parents, alumni,
faculty, and staff have significant interests in
how the institution is operated and who is
allowed on campus.

•

Hosting an encampment
poses practical and
transformational
pedagogical opportunities.

•

When universities put residents in the position
of teachers—or worse, subjects to be studied—
they risk appropriating the experiences of
encampment residents.

B. Third-Party Operators
Authorized encampments in Seattle are typically operated by a third-party entity,
which provides social services and supervises the daily operations of the encampment. The
third-party operator also acts as liaison to the City: it applies for the initial land-use permit,
negotiates contracts with the City and other partners like utility providers, and receives
reimbursements from the City for some expenses of operating the encampment.111 In Seattle,
permitted encampments generally evolved from unauthorized encampment communities that
receive permission to relocate to city-owned land for a one-year period when the City approves
a new transitional encampment site. Such communities often have existing group living
agreements, or codes of conduct, which serve as the basis for the operational plans once the
encampment becomes authorized by the city. The established leadership within those
communities retain autonomy to varying degrees once the encampment agrees to partner
with an operator. While third-party operators can offer valuable expertise and oversight, critics
are concerned this arrangement diminishes the residents’ feeling of self-determination,
undercutting one of the essential benefits of living in an encampment.
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1. Nickelsville, SHARE/WHEEL, & LIHI
Homeless encampments have existed in Seattle for decades,112 but not until November
2015 did Seattle Mayor Ed Murray and King County Executive Dow Constantine declare states
of emergency around homelessness, requesting emergency funding and establishing
administrative authority to create immediate responses to the crisis that had been brewing for
years.113 The action authorized the city’s first permitted homeless encampments with a land
use code permitting transitional encampments as interim use for certain types of city-owned
land.114 Besides outlining zoning requirements for land put to such use, the code requires
community outreach, operations standards, and a community advisory committee (CAC).115
The Seattle code also authorizes an operator role for an organization to serve as liaison
between the City and the encampment to manage daily operations and contracts with
secondary providers like waste management, volunteers donating meals, and case
managers.116 Seattle requires that role to be filled by a qualified encampment operator (such as
Nickelsville, SHARE/WHEEL, or LIHI) vetted by the Human Services Department.117 The Seattle
encampments are operated through partnerships between these organizations.118 Though the
terminology is not entirely consistent across the board, LIHI essentially functions as a
sponsor—responsible for "case management, site development, tiny house construction
coordination, [and] volunteer management"—while Nickelsville and SHARE/WHEEL are
responsible for daily management including "enforcing the code of conduct, intake
procedures, and village oversight" in their respective encampments.119
Perhaps the most famous organically-seeded encampment in Seattle, Nickelsville was
established as organized encampment in 2008, when homeless advocates set up an
unauthorized camp on city-owned land in a highly visible critique of then-Mayor Greg Nickels’
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Photo: Real Change News120

treatment of homeless people in
Seattle.120 Over the next several
years, Nickelsville encampments
frequently shifted locations in
response to “sweeps”121 by city
officials, but the organization was
eventually approved to operate
permitted encampments following
City Council’s approval of the
authorized encampment ordinance
in March 2015.122 Today, Nickelsville
operates three authorized
encampments: Ballard Nickelsville,
Georgetown Village, and Othello
Village.123

SHARE/WHEEL fills a similar
managerial role for two of the other sanctioned encampments: Interbay Tent City 5 and Licton
Springs Village.124 Seattle Housing and Resource Effort (SHARE) and the Women’s Housing
Equality Enhancement League (WHEEL), collectively SHARE/WHEEL, are partner
organizations of current and formerly homeless men and women, operating shelters and tent
cities in King County, Washington.125
The Low-Income Housing Institute (LIHI) is a Seattle-based organization that provides
permanent, supportive, and transitional housing services.126 Besides operating several of the
120
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permitted sites, LIHI acts as fiscal sponsor for the encampments operated by SHARE and
Nickelsville.127 The City of Seattle funds operational costs like supplies, portable toilets, and
supportive services staffing, and LIHI has the accounting capabilities to track finances.128
Community donors fund meals and tiny houses for LIHI's sites.129 As a fiscal partner, LIHI plays
a supportive role to the day-to-day operators. LIHI acts as a property manager: it coordinates
supplies and manages volunteers who build tiny homes and platforms for tents.130
LIHI also provides case management services for the encampments it operates.131 Given
LIHI’s role as a housing service provider, its staff was experienced in interacting with the
population of individuals living in homeless encampments and in understanding their service
needs.132 As of this writing, LIHI operates seven sites, including some authorized encampments
with few structures, some “tiny home villages,”133 and some hybrids of the two.134 Like most
shelter programs, LIHI's program success is evaluated by the number of people moved into
permanent housing.135
Each of the Seattle encampment operators share oversight with community advisory
committees (CACs), as required by the city ordinance authorizing encampments.136 The CACs
for consist of representatives of various stakeholder groups, including camp leadership,
operator staff, representatives from the city, neighbors, and people who oppose homeless
encampments. The CACs meet regularly to keep all parties appraised of the recent events at
the encampment and to hear and respond to concerns from the surrounding community.
2. Summary of Challenges & Opportunities
The primary benefits of third-party operators are oversight and expertise. Running an
authorized encampment is no simple task, and the experience of an operating organization
can be invaluable. Third-party operators can fill gaps in capacity that encampment residents
often lack—because they do not know the technical requirements of the secondary providers
(such as vehicle access points for waste management), do not have the skillset for
bookkeeping, or do not have the time to oversee the camp because they work. In contrast to
resident operators, third-party operators can develop expertise and provide impartial
127
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oversight, important qualities for cities concerned about financial transparency and measuring
success.
On the other hand, placing authority in the hands of third party can feel paternalistic for
encampment residents. Just as nonprofit organizations can cultivate expertise from operating
multiple encampments, individuals who reside in those encampments can develop unique
perspectives about what encampments need to be successful. Third-party operators risk losing
sight of the resident experience in favor of their own judgment. Further, the disconnect
between decision-makers and the people who must live by those decisions can undermine
some values of encampment living, like dignity and autonomy.

Opportunities

Challenges

•

Third-party operators provide
valuable oversight, particularly
when they can provide checks and
balances for encampment
operations and resolve conflicts
impartially.

•

Placing authority in the hands of a
third party can feel paternalistic to
encampment residents who
understand what an encampment
needs to be successful from their onthe-ground experience.

•

These organizations can also offer
expertise in areas of management
that a layperson wouldn’t
necessarily know, like bookkeeping
or waste management.

•

The disconnect between decisionmakers and residents can undermine
benefits to encampment living like
dignity and autonomy.

C. Self-Governance
Other encampments have rejected the third-party operator model as paternalistic and
undermining of the self-determination value of a permitted encampment. Instead, these
encampments govern themselves, valuing democracy above the benefits of third-party
operating partners. However, self-governed encampments are not immune to the challenges
that plague other new democracies: few written rules leading to inconsistent application,
leadership elected based on influence rather than competence, and more. But residents in selfgoverned encampments have ownership over the rules they live by, and potentially get more
out of the community and self-determination aspects of encampment living compared to
encampments operated by an outside entity. Yet, self-governed encampments struggle to
balance these benefits with ethical leadership and capable oversight.
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1. Camp Second Chance
Dates of Operation

April 2016–present (sanctioned February 2017)

Capacity

40–50 people

Location

Meyers Way, in south Seattle

Camp Second Chance is an organically-seeded encampment established by former
Tent City 3 residents who had split with TC3 over disagreements regarding sobriety
requirements and what self-governance ought to look like in a homeless encampment.137
Camp Second Chance famously found its home by cutting the lock fencing in a city-owned lot
near Myers Way so the encampment could move in.138 Initially unauthorized to camp there,
Camp Second Chance aimed to win over its neighbors’ hearts and support by being friendly,
well-managed, and exceptionally clean and orderly.139 Camp Second Chance voted for
Patacara to serve as its fiscal sponsor, leaving self-governance to its residents, and Patacara
eventually received a contract with the City of Seattle to operate Camp Second Chance as a
permitted encampment, based on the perseverance of the encampment and acceptance from
the neighborhood.140
From its inception, Camp Second Chance envisioned democratic self-governance that
vested authority to make and enforce policies in the camp residents themselves, rather than in
an external body like an operating partner.141 Camp Second Chance residents were concerned
that the encampments authorized by the city of Seattle were more “self-managed,” than “selfgoverned,” meaning that campers had significant responsibilities but little power.142 When
Patacara received its contract with the City of Seattle for Camp Second Chance to become a
permitted encampment, funding meant that Patacara could hire a site manager.143 This shift in
137

Ashley Archibald, A New Kind of Camp, REAL CHANGE NEWS (Feb. 22, 2017)
http://realchangenews.org/2017/02/22/new-kind-camp; Interview with Polly Trout, supra note 22.
138
Reed Ingalls, Breaking Chains and Building Bridges: Patacara Wins Contract for Homeless Camp, 30 NORTHWEST
DHARMA NEWS 1, https://northwestdharma.org/2017/03/breaking-chains-and-building-bridges-patacara-winscontract-for-homeless-camp/. “Patacara Community Services is a faith-based nonprofit offering compassionate
and respectful care to those who are suffering.” PATACARA COMMUNITY SERVICES, http://patacara.org/.
139
Daniel Beekman, Proposal Asks Seattle City Council to OK New Limits on Homeless Sweeps on Public Land, THE
SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016, updated Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/politics/proposal-to-seattle-city-council-seeks-to-further-limit-homeless-sweeps-on-public-land/; Interview
with Polly Trout, supra note 22.
140
Dyer Oxley, Seattle’s Camp Second Chance Gets a Second Chance, MY NORTHWEST (Feb. 9, 2017),
http://mynorthwest.com/539598/camp-second-chance-city-contract/; Interview with Polly Trout, supra note 22.
141
Interview with Polly Trout, supra note 22.
142
Id. According to some advocates, Camp Second Chance was established precisely because of the distinction
between self-governance and self-management. Some people who had been part of TC3 (managed by SHARE)
were unhappy with that camp’s management structure and split off to form Camp Second Chance as a more
independent, democratic encampment. Ashley Archibald, Camp Second Chance Splits with Supporting Nonprofit,
REAL CHANGE NEWS (Sept. 6, 2017), http://www.realchangenews.org/2017/09/06/camp-second-chance-splitssupporting-nonprofit.
143
Interview with Polly Trout, supra note 22.

29

power and influx of resources led to problems when most of the original residents moved on
into housing, and many of those who remained were resistant to sharing leadership in a robust
democracy.144 The idealistic model of self-governance was also vulnerable to abuse due to the
transient nature of the population of encampment residents.145 As some residents moved on
to other housing arrangements—taking their institutional knowledge with them—it became
challenging to maintain ethical leadership long-term.146
Notably, Camp Second Chance itself has not been party to any contract with Patacara
or with the city, since the encampment is not itself an official entity with legal rights. Rather,
Patacara contracted with the city directly, and Patacara and Camp Second Chance never
executed a written agreement specifying the terms of fiscal sponsorship or how power and
responsibility would be shared.147 Some advocates believe the funding from the City arguably
“upped the odds” of this dynamic, creating more incentives to “play dirty.”148 Disputes over
power dynamics, unilateral decision-making, unfair enforcement of camp policies, and a
general lack of transparency raged, and eventually the camp leadership and its operating
partner agreed to part ways.149 Ultimately, uncertainty about how the partner organization
should check decisions made by the encampment residents—or whether the partner
organization even ought to—became an existential crisis for Camp Second Chance.150
Camp Second Chance remained at its original location but needed a new organizational
partner to serve as its fiscal sponsor to retain its permitted status with the City of Seattle. As a
result, LIHI took over the contract to operate Camp Second Chance. While the new contract
resolved some of the immediate problems facing Camp Second Chance, like clarifying certain
roles and policies, it also presented new challenges. Most important, the change in the
operating partner raised significant disputes over the proper degree of self-governance.151 As
of this writing, leaders within Camp Second Chance, LIHI staff, and committed allies continue
to negotiate a balance of authority, oversight, and cooperation.152
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2. Dignity Village
Dates of Operation

December 2001–present (sanctioned in 2004)

Capacity

60 people

Location

Sunderland Yard, in north Portland

Dignity Village was established as an organically-seeded unauthorized encampment in
2001 in Portland, Oregon, in response to sweeps of smaller encampments.153 Within a year,
Dignity Village registered as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, whose mission was to “improve
the lives of the poor in Portland by operating a “community-based living facility” for people
unable to find other shelter.154 While the initial encampment changed locations in response to
frequent sweeps, residents eventually settled in an industrial area in southeast Portland called
Sunderland Yard, which would become the village’s permanent home.155 In 2004, Dignity
Village became sanctioned under the state of Oregon’s “transitional housing
accommodations” statute authorizing municipalities to designate a campground within the
urban area as an authorized encampment. 156
Dignity Village operates as a membership-based nonprofit; residents in “good
standing” comprise the membership of the nonprofit and enjoy voting privileges regarding the
community policies and decisions at monthly meetings.157 Members in good standing are
residents who contribute at least ten hours per week of “sweat equity” work in contribution to
Village operations and maintenance and pay a monthly insurance fee of $35.00.158 Members
elect a councilors who serve one-year terms, including a Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson,
Secretary, and Treasurer.159 The council meets weekly to report out on recent developments
and resolve conflicts within the Village.160 While the contract with the City includes a fulltime
Program Support Specialist staff position, that individual does not have decision-making
power over Village business; rather, the Specialist provides operational support and acts as
liaison with service providers.161
During the most recent significant contract renegotiation in 2012, the City of Portland
expressed concern about individuals staying at the Village indefinitely, as a sign that the
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Village was not fulfilling its
purpose as a transitional living
space.162 As a result, the Village
agreed to reactivate a dormant
policy limiting individual stays to
two years.163 However,
extensions are available for
people on subsidized housing
wait lists, or awaiting decisions
from the Social Security
Administration, as long as they
actively comply with the
respective process.164 And, to
preserve institutional knowledge,
villagers serving in leadership
positions can receive extensions
Photo: Dignity Village154
165
to complete their terms.
142
However, the Village has no term limits for their leadership positions, so villagers can (and
sometimes do) stay for several years.166
Dignity Village has been described as “volatile, precarious, and incredibly resilient” due
to its self-governance structure.167 For example, the Village has struggled to find memberresidents with the skills to fill certain roles required by its nonprofit status.168 While some
residents developed ownership over their duties, this process can result in a lack of
delegation.169 Further, since some residents have lived in the Village for eight or even ten
years, certain perspectives and sources of power became entrenched, so innovative ideas are
often shut down quickly.170
3. Summary of Challenges & Opportunities
Both self-governed encampments struggle to strike the optimal balance between their
values of dignity and autonomy with the necessity for oversight and checks and balances. One
common incident is illustrative of this dilemma:171
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Residents Anna, Bob, and Catherine live in a self-governed encampment. The rules of
the encampment are enforced by an elected council, and both Anna and Catherine are
councilmembers. Among other provisions, the encampment’s code of conduct includes:
1. A zero-tolerance policy for consuming alcohol on-site;
2. A general procedure for one resident to accuse another of violating one of the camp
policies by presenting evidence at a regular council meeting, open to all residents of
the encampment; and
3. A right to appeal decisions made by the camp council.
Resident Anna conflicts with Bob over a personal
matter, and Anna uses the camp’s zero-tolerance alcohol
One resident can serve
policy to oust Bob from the encampment. Anna plants an
as witness, prosecutor,
empty liquor bottle in Bob’s tent while Bob is eating
judge, and jury.
dinner. Then, Anna finds Catherine, who is serving on
security duty. Anna tells Catherine she has seen Bob acting
intoxicated. Catherine decides that Anna’s description is sufficient cause to enter Bob’s tent,
where Catherine finds the empty liquor bottle. At the next council meeting, Anna and
Catherine present evidence against Bob, and Anna uses her position of authority to persuade
the other councilmembers to vote to evict Bob based on his violation of a non-negotiable rule.
In this not uncommon scenario,172 one resident can serve as witness, prosecutor, judge,
and jury, wielding enormous power over the fate of another person. Bob might have a nominal
right to appeal the decision, but the result is unlikely to change, particularly if Anna is one of
the people charged with reviewing Bob’s case. While this arrangement may seem manifestly
unjust for a person in Bob’s position, it technically comports with the rules and governance
structure agreed to by all residents of the encampment. And if the encampment has
deliberately chosen to operate without the oversight of an independent body, it can be very
difficult to check unethical behavior.
Although the self-governance model reflects encampment values of autonomy and
dignity by vesting the power to determine rules in the residents who must live by them, the
actual effect can be to diminish the rights of individual residents. A self-governed encampment
is especially vulnerable to problems like unethical leadership and uncertain processes when it
lacks an effective mechanism for checks and balances or oversight. 173 This problem is further
complicated by issues of institutional knowledge: as residents who understand the rules and
know who might take advantage move on to more stable housing, encampments lose valuable
perspective that could otherwise protect against unethical leadership. Further, since
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homelessness can be an extremely traumatizing experience, self-governance poses the danger
of further distressing residents when leaders lack training in trauma-informed care.174
Opportunities
•

Challenges

Vesting rule-making
power in encampment
residents promotes
autonomy and dignity.

•

The transitional nature of encampments makes
it difficult to retain ethical leadership over
time.

•

Enforcing due process is difficult in the absence
of impartial oversight.

D. Compulsory Encampments
Some cities authorized encampments in response to public health emergencies,
building new encampment sites and requiring people experiencing homelessness to relocate to
the newly permitted encampments for their own safety. While these encampments may
represent cities’ recognition of the detrimental health effects of living outdoors, their
compulsory participation has raised serious concerns about the manner of implementation.
1. San Diego, California
Dates of Operation

October 2017—present

Capacity

136 people

Location

Golden Hill, East San Diego

San Diego, California authorized its first homeless encampment in October 2017 in
response to the city’s recent Hepatitis A outbreak. 175 Unhoused people lacked basic sanitation
and hygiene facilities that would otherwise prevent contamination, and the disease spread
with devastating efficiency among people experiencing homelessness in downtown San Diego.
176 “Hepatitis A is spread through unsanitary conditions, and the outbreak has
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disproportionately affected the homeless
population. More than 370 people have been
hospitalized and of the 20 people who have died,
11 were homeless.”177
In an initial response to the outbreak, the
City brought in crews to power-wash sidewalks
with bleach in downtown neighborhoods
frequently populated by homeless people.178
Unhoused people camping in downtown areas of
San Diego had to remove all of their belongings
for the cleaning, but when they returned later,
they were met by police who told them “the area
had to be cleared to break the cycle that has
caused the hepatitis a virus to spread.”179 Though
most people cooperated, some were arrested,
and no one was provided prior notice of this
police action.180

Map: San Diego Union-Tribune178

To keep homeless people away from the
downtown areas most plagued by the sanitation
issue, San Diego opened a sanctioned alternative
camping site on city-owned land. On a city
maintenance yard, the site provides space for 136
individuals, bathrooms, storage, and 24-hour
security.181 The Alpha Project, a local nonprofit
that provides transitional housing, emergency
service, and other outreach and case
management services, operates the “transitional
campsite” and provides transportation in and out
of the camp for residents with medical
appointments or other business in the downtown
area.182 However, residents of the encampment
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have little say in how the encampment is operated.183 Since the Alpha Project is experienced in
operating transitional housing, it determines the rules by which residents of the encampment
live.184
The encampment may
“Hepatitis A is spread through unsanitary
address the immediate health crisis
conditions, and the outbreak has
by providing a more sanitary living
disproportionately affected the homeless
environment and offering medical
population. More than 370 people have
care to people already affected by
been hospitalized and of the 20 people
the virus. However, the City paired
who have died, 11 were homeless.”186
the opening of the sanctioned
encampment with increased policing
in the downtown areas most affected by the viral outbreak.185 Citing the need to “keep[] public
areas clean and prevent[] the unsanitary conditions that helped fuel the outbreak from
returning,” the City prohibited any further camping in downtown San Diego, effectively
compelling unhoused people to move to the new permitted encampment.186 Advocates are
concerned this policy reflects a mere desire to “round up” people experiencing homelessness,
rather than to establish an intentional community for people to transition into permanent
housing.187 The San Diego encampment has even been compared to an internment camp,
based on the tactics of requiring a certain class of people to relocate to a site controlled by
someone else.188 Further, early reporting suggests that very few individuals have exited in the
encampment into permanent housing.189
2. Tacoma, Washington
Mitigation Site

Stabilization Site

Dates of Operation

May–June 2017

June 2017–present

Capacity

30–80 people

80 people

Location

East 18th and Portland Avenue,
Port of Tacoma

Portland Avenue East and
Puyallup Avenue, Port of Tacoma
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Tacoma, Washington authorized its first homeless encampment in May 2017, under
the City Council’s declaration of a state of public health emergency recognizing how
homelessness impairs people’s physical, mental, and behavioral health.190 Tacoma declared
the state of emergency after a spike in complaints from business owners concerned about the
impact of existing unauthorized homeless encampments on their businesses, dating to January
2017.191 In the spring of 2017, one prominent business voiced louder and stronger concerns
about a nearby unauthorized homeless encampment that had recently grown to over 100
individual residents, a very large encampment for a city of Tacoma’s size.192 When Tacoma
responded by clearing out that encampment, it forced those people into other areas of town,
growing some of the other encampments from around a dozen residents to thirty or forty.193
Businesses and neighborhood entities near the smaller encampments then complained about
the influx of people.194
The City planned
to address the public
health crisis in a threephase Emergency
Temporary Aid and
Sheltering Plan.195 The
first phase involved
bringing social services
and basic necessities to
an existing encampment
to address immediate
needs for six weeks.196
Tacoma is currently in its
second phase, which
consists of an enclosed,

Image: City of Tacoma192

190
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temperature-controlled tent with stricter rules and screening processes in addition to
services.197 The third phase will focus on creating new short-term transitional housing.198
Phase One paired Tacoma’s first temporary authorized encampment with increased
law enforcement regarding public camping, car camping, and drug and sex trafficking. The City
Council passed an emergency zoning and land use ordinance to allow the city to site temporary
emergency shelters and named one of the larger existing unauthorized encampment sites as
its first “Mitigation Site.”199 The city contracted with local service providers Comprehensive
Life Resources and the Tacoma Rescue Mission to manage the site and coordinate service
delivery.200
The Mitigation Site, otherwise known by locals as “the compound,” consisted of around
thirty residents, many who had lived there for a year or more.201 When the City declared that
site its first permitted encampment, it required people living in other unauthorized sites to
relocate to the compound, resulting in the population literally doubling overnight.202 The influx
of unfamiliar people disrupted the individuals already living as a community at the compound,
including some who had been there for over a year.203 The long-term residents felt
uncomfortable with so many strangers around, and the newcomers’ experiences were
chaotic.204

Photo: The News Tribune193

Establishing the Mitigation Site
brought social service providers and basic
amenities to the compound. Prior to the city
contract, the community had group living
agreements, which prohibited theft and
nonresident guests. When the compound
was named the Mitigation Site, these
agreements were formalized and the
residents created leadership roles and
weekly community meetings.205 A network
of local organizations set up a robust
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schedule of services,206 including needle exchanges, healthcare, housing navigators,
transportation to appointments, food, mental health counseling, and drug treatment.207 These
service providers also set up a massive email listserv of over 70 providers, and key participants
still meet weekly to keep each other updated on activities at the Mitigation Site (and later, the
Stability Site) and solve problems together.208 Amenities included drinking water,
handwashing stations, portable toilets, and waste disposal.209
Because business owners were concerned about drug and sex trafficking attendant to
the unauthorized encampments, the
first phase of the City’s plan included
increased law enforcement efforts.210
However, no police were stationed at
the Mitigation Site.211 The site was
staffed by a security agency 24/7, but
its job was to protect the City’s assets,
not to arrest residents.212 While some
residents were glad police were not
monitoring their activity at the
encampment, others would have
Photo: The News Tribune193
213
preferred more police protection.
Phase One was short term, lasting only for six weeks while the Stability Site for phase
two was built. Residents at the Mitigation Site were told that the encampment would be shut
down at the end of June 2017, and anyone living there would be offered a spot at the new
encampment site.214 Nearly all of the Mitigation Site residents moved to the Stability Site
when the time came, though some could not stay because they did not meet the criteria for
entry; others left later to live in environments with more individual freedom.215
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In Phase Two, residents live under a
large tent with running water and space for
up to eighty-five people.216 A shelter
provider operates the encampment, known
as the Stability Site, and has made a
significant effort to run the encampment
with input from the residents.217 However,
keeping residents engaged in leadership has
been a challenge, likely due to a
combination of feelings of trauma and stress
with a lack of ownership in the endeavor.
Tacoma has had difficulty moving people
into housing from the outset. Due to the
Photo: Citylab216
scarcity of permanent supportive housing
facilities in Pierce County, very few people find placements.218 Many potential residents are
excluded from the Mitigation site, because admission to one of the limited available spaces is
based on vulnerability.219
Tacoma City Council is now considering several amendments to the ordinance
permitting encampments as temporary shelters. Amendments include increasing the number
of sanctioned encampments allowed in the city from two to six, with no more than two in any
one police sector.220 The amended regulations would also "allow for a variety of sheltering
models," including indoor shelters and vehicle residency, and would allow temporary shelters
to stay in the same location for up to a year.221 Providers are interested in implementing
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additional sanctioned encampments in Tacoma, but felt this longer duration was necessary to
justify the investment of time and effort of setting up temporary emergency shelter.222
Perhaps most egregiously, the city followed the
opening of the encampment with even harsher
treatment of homeless people who are not residents of
the permitted encampment: banning public camping.223
The new ordinance makes “unlawful camping” on
public property a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment for up to 90 days, a fine up to $1,000, or
both.224 The camping ban and increased policing
Photo: The News Tribune225
policies were enacted “to appease some Tacomans who
complain about negative impacts that can accompany homelessness,”225 despite warnings that
such a ban was likely to make the problem of homelessness worse and could unconstitutionally
criminalize homelessness in violation of the Eighth Amendment.226 And, since the Stability Site
and other shelters are often full, the remaining homeless population has few options for places
to sleep and camp and avoid citation.227
3. Summary of Challenges & Opportunities
The compulsory participation model reflects a city’s recognition of a very serious and
urgent problem: homelessness is very dangerous to one’s health. However, this approach
becomes problematic when it means offering unsheltered people the choice between going to
the new permitted encampment or getting cited or
arrested, when paired with increased enforcement of
Cities using emergency
laws that criminalize homelessness. This compelled
response models
participation suggests that cities using compulsory
probably do want to solve
models probably want to solve the immediate health
the immediate health
crisis, but they also want to control people. Critics of
compulsory encampments have compared them to
crisis, but they also want
internment camps: rounding up a particular class of
to control people.
people, informing them they must relocate for their own
222
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good or for the public good, and then requiring them to live by rules over which they have no
ownership. It's challenging to implement an encampment project swiftly without sliding into
these pitfalls that undermine the value of permitted encampments.
Opportunities
•

Compulsory encampments
often reflect a genuine
recognition of the urgent
homelessness crisis and the
serious health problems
associated with living
outdoors.

Challenges
•

Compulsory encampments are often paired
with increased policing, criminalizing the
daily lives of people for whom the
sanctioned encampments are not a viable
option.

•

Compulsory encampments reflect a desire to
control people and deprive residents of
autonomy.

II. Operational Issues
Operational structures can and should vary, depending on goals and values of a
particular encampment and on the social, political, and physical environment of the local area.
Each encampment will want to set up services for basic necessities like food, water, bathroom
facilities, and waste disposal. Some encampments may wish to arrange for electricity and
internet and may build semi-permanent structures like tiny houses as opposed to tents. All
encampments will also contract with social service providers that might include housing
navigators, mental health counselors, medical professionals, and vocational skills trainers. This
Part examines several operational factors affecting the remaining secondary operational
decisions: duration, delegation of duties, and governance and enforcement.

A. Duration
Duration may be limited by city rules or negotiated by parties to address concerns such
as availability of space and increasing stability for encampment residents.228 For example,
encampments authorized by the City of Seattle can remain at their permitted locations for one
year, with an option to renew for a second year.229 Past encampments were permitted for
shorter periods: Seattle University hosted TC3 for just one month in 2005, and SHARE has
typically operated its encampments for 90 days.230 Some residents, hosts, and service
228
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providers felt that 90 days was too disruptive, so encampments on City of Seattle land are now
authorized for a one-year period with an option to renew for a second year based on
“successful operation.”231 Success is measured by performance commitments contained in the
contract between the City and the operator, such as target numbers for meeting emergency
and immediate shelter needs and individuals entering transitional and permanent housing. 232
In contrast, Tacoma, Washington allows temporary shelters to remain at a location for
up to 185 days (roughly six months) with the possibility of a “one-time extension of up to 40
days, or longer in the case of inclement weather.”233 Tacoma further limits temporary shelters
from returning to the same site only after six
months have lapsed since the end of the
Partners must share a specific
previous temporary shelter.234
Given the significant benefits associated
with stability and the burdens on the parties
(both during the stay and associated with each
move), groups planning for authorized
encampments should thoughtfully consider a
host term that strikes the right balance between
costs and benefits.

objective for the authorized
encampment. Is it an on-going
intentional community?
Or a stop-gap measure for
people transitioning into
permanent housing?

In the university-host context, a shortterm stay (such as 90 days) can coincide well with the academic calendar and appease public
concerns about the institutions staying focused on their academic purposes.235 However, as the
university hosting relationship flourishes with deep community engagement and mutual
learning opportunities between the camp residents and university community, university hosts
may require more lead time to prepare for even a short-term hosting period. The planning
period for the university requires all the same operational, legal, and social preparation as
encampments on religious or city land, but with the additional tasks of cultivating institutional
buy-in and developing curriculum. Each of the Seattle-based university hosts clarified that they
could not undertake hosting an encampment without persistent students prepared to take on
a lot of legwork and institutional leadership amenable to the idea. At the University of
Washington, for example, this process took several years, meaning that many students
involved in the initial effort had graduated by the time their vision came to fruition; the student
organization had to continue to recruit underclassmen to take up the work, knowing that even
they may not see the encampment at their school before they graduate.
Perhaps the most important consideration in operating an authorized encampment is
how the parties envision a mutual end goal of the project. Parties involved in authorized
encampments share the ultimate goal of ending homelessness, but they may hold different
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visions of the role of encampments as a means to that end.236 Partners implementing
authorized encampments should also share a specific objective—either to operate the
encampment as an on-going alternative to less-safe outdoor living arrangements or as a stopgap measure for people to move into other forms of transitional or permanent housing.237
Those two approaches involve different logistical and social implications that should be
carefully planned ahead of time. For example, a long-term encampment might need more
substantial dwellings like tiny houses (as opposed to tents on pallets) and more sophisticated
or permanent arrangements for running water and waste management than an environment
intended for shorter-term residence.238 On the other hand, an encampment modeled as a
transitional step might do with less permanent dwellings but would require a greater
investment in service delivery, like a higher ratio of case workers to work to get residents into
housing.239

B. Delegation of Duties
Contracts between the landowner (city or university, for purposes of this brief) and the
operating partner (for example, Nickelsville, SHARE, or Patacara in the Seattle case studies;
Alpha Project in San Diego) typically address location and service term, payment, delegation
of duties relating to hygiene and safety, indemnification, and expectations around
communication. In Seattle, the obligations of the encampment operator also include
developing a governance structure
to create a shared power and decision making structure where residents
participate in the adoption and enforcement of policy, assist with security and
property maintenance . . . and share experience and expertise with their peers.
These experiences are intended to promote balanced and shared power, and
skill development in conflict resolution, communication and leadership.240
However, it is unclear how effectively the encampment operators achieve this commendable
objective. Because the Seattle encampments are managed by organizations with long histories
of homeless advocacy, the historical governance structures of SHARE/WHEEL and Nickelsville
have been applied to that city's authorized encampments, regardless of how well they reflect
the power dynamic desired by the encampment residents.241
Notably, neither the residents of the encampment nor its governing board are parties
to this agreement between the operating partner and the landowner. However, each
encampment is governed by a code of conduct and grievance procedures, incorporated into
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the landowner/operator contract by reference.242 For a well-operated encampment, this tiered
relationship has many benefits. It allows an organization with infrastructure to work with the
landowner to work out insurance and financial agreements, while leaving the policy decisions
about camp governance to the residents who develop the code of conduct. Ideally, the
organization in the middle understands and can navigate between the needs of the parties on
either end to work out other important operational concerns like safety policies, meals, and
service delivery.
However, such a role is difficult to fill. By its role in the middle, the operating partner
can be simultaneously pulled in one direction by the encampment residents (who want
stability and autonomy so they can focus on rehabilitation) and another by local governments
(who want to get people into housing, but feel pressure to meet deadlines and milestones that
may not be entirely realistic).The operator must be prepared to take on significant risks
associated with running an encampment: indemnifying the landowner against any claims
arising from conduct of residents, staff, or volunteers, and taking the brunt of public opinion.
243 Successful partnerships cannot be done effectively without trusting relationships between
all parties.244

C. Governance & Enforcement
It is well understood that autonomy is one of the primary benefits of encampment
living as opposed to homeless shelters; however, autonomy shifts once an encampment
agrees to comply with an operator and landowner’s needs in exchange for its permitted status.
The question becomes to what extent camp residents will sacrifice some autonomy and to
what extent the landowner can be flexible with its requirements. Perhaps most important, this
bargain is governed by existing power structures, meaning that encampments face automatic
disadvantages like the risk of sweeps if they remain unauthorized.
The encampment must retain some sense of self-ownership, if for no other reason than
the fact that operating partners lack the capacity to do so.
While the scope of camp authority can vary, the two basic
“Often, ‘self-managed’
models can generally be described as “self-governance” and
is a euphemism for
“self-management.”245 Self-governance would involve
understaffed.”245
democratic representation from within the encampment
community and buy-in from neighbors and other
stakeholders, but ultimately leave policy decisions to the
encampment residents themselves. In contrast, self-management would shift some of that
authority to the operator (and arguably to the city as well) but leave implementation to the
residents on the ground.
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Both models pose challenges. A self-governance structure is vulnerable to the dangers
of entrenched power, corruption, and incompetence present in any true democracy.246 Selfmanagement can lack sufficient resources and oversight to work effectively.
Another concern with either model of governance is
retaining competent, ethical leadership representative of a
Plan a governance
population that is by definition transitory. The question of
structure that
leadership within homeless encampments is truly a doublereflects the purpose
edged sword: many residents who hold institutional
of the encampment.
knowledge about how to run the encampment eventually
become housed. Permanent housing is the goal of authorized
encampments as interim solutions to homelessness and the goal of virtually all unhoused
people. But once an individual gets into housing, they are no longer residents of the
encampment with the requisite personal stake in operating the camp that defines selfmanagement or self-governance; nor do they necessarily possess the time or interest to
continue in a leadership role in the camp. This outcome is obviously a boon for the individual,
but it inevitably means a loss of experienced leadership for the camp and can lead to
accountability problems among long-term residents.
How can advocates reconcile the need for long-term memory and leadership
experience, the benefits of autonomy, and the end goal of getting people out of
homelessness? Some experts have posited that we still have not answered the question of how
to create stable, ethical leadership over time, but have suggested mechanisms that might
support this objective.247
For example, former residents who get into housing “shouldn’t have to martyr
themselves” by staying behind to self-govern from within the encampments.248 Rather,
governing boards could include current and former residents (who have moved into housing)
who receive compensation for their service.249 These roles could carry meaningful job titles like
“program coordinator” or “program coordination intern” and include professional
development and training in self-governance, which could translate to future jobs.250
Encampments should plan a governance structure that reflects the purpose of the
encampment. Whether the objective of the encampment is to build an intentional community
or to respond to an immediate health crisis will inform how much say the residents should
have, who enforces the rules, and what procedures are necessary to resolve conflicts.

III. Legal Issues
Cities often authorize transitional encampments by ordinance, and any encampment
inevitably involves relationships and agreements between several entities. Therefore, careful
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legal drafting is critical to every aspect of authorized encampments. Land use ordinances and
contracts between the primary parties should anticipate limitations and risks posed by
encampments and should formulate zoning laws and contracts that sufficiently address these
issues. Further, encampment rules and regulations should be vetted to adequately protect the
rights of residents, particularly in settings where individual discretion could skew
administration. The specific legal issues any potential encampment may confront are fact- and
jurisdiction-specific; however, this section surveys a few common legal considerations.

A. Zoning & Land Use
When a city authorizes homeless encampments on public land, it has the authority to
determine the parameters of an appropriate location. Considerations might include proximity
to public transportation,251 the nature of the area’s current or nearby uses,252 vehicle
accessibility for waste disposal and other service providers, the existence or readiness for
plumbing, and the quality of the surface of the land. A municipality should carefully consider
the breadth of sizing options and understand how many viable locations would fit the
parameters.253 A city with a very large homeless population, for example, should consider the
sizing options so that more than one location could satisfy the standards.254
Cities may also write operational parameters into the codified permitting requirements.
For example, the Tacoma Municipal Code authorizes the Director of Planning and
Development Services to issue permits for temporary homeless shelters “only upon
demonstration that all public health and safety considerations have been adequately
addressed” and to revoke permits “if the City determines the site is unfit for human habitation
based on sanitary conditions or health related concerns.”255 The same Chapter requires
portable water, toilets, handwashing stations, waste disposal, and minimum spacing
requirements per resident to prevent overcrowding.256
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B. Liability
Liability and insurance coverage may be addressed in the city ordinances authorizing
encampments and in contracts between landowners and operating organizations.257 It is
unsurprising that contracts between landowners and operating organizations include
additional insurance and indemnification clauses. What might be surprising, however, is how
rarely these clauses are invoked. For example, when a camp-associated dumpster failed to lock
in place and accidentally rolled into a government vehicle parked near the TC3 encampment at
University of Washington, no one bothered to file an insurance claim; SHARE simply cut a
check to cover the costs to repair the dent directly.258 These provisions likely anticipate more
serious incidents, like violent or negligent conduct by residents or operators that cause
significant harm to people or property within the encampment or the surrounding community.
This concern may be grounded in some of the common misconceptions about the behavior of
homeless people, though research shows these worries are largely misguided.259

C. Residents’ Rights: Due Process & Contractual Obligations
Relevant to the earlier discussion of degrees of autonomy and self-governance is the
question of encampment residents’ legal rights. Given that residents are not typically party to
the contracts between landowners and operators, do residents have any claims to enforce
those contracts?260 This question has not yet been tested, perhaps because encampment
residents are more concerned with their rights relating to camp codes of conduct and removal
procedures. For example, many codes of conduct specify qualifications for entry and
prohibited conduct within the encampment, and require signed agreement as a condition to
become a resident.261 Virtually all encampment codes of conduct contain provisions regarding
conduct that can cause a resident to be temporarily or permanently “barred” from the
encampment, such as violent or threatening behavior toward another resident or violation of
prohibitions on alcohol or drugs.262 These rules are often among encampments’ zero-tolerance
policies, so the stakes are high when an individual resident is accused of violating one, and any
such allegations should not be taken lightly.
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But do these codes of conduct provide sufficient due process to individuals who might
challenge their evictions based on alleged violations? For instance, in self-governed
encampments, the same individual may serve in the roles
of witness, prosecutor, and judge in an instance of alleged
Do codes of conduct
rule-breaking. If the encampment rules do not provide for
some recusal for conflicts of interest, the accused
provide sufficient due
individual is not guaranteed that his or her fate will be
process for residents
determined by an impartial decision-maker. And if the
accused of violating
procedure for bringing and deciding a rule violation charge
encampment rules?
is not sufficiently documented, there may be little
guarantee of a consistent or fair process.
Further, some legal experts have suggested that codes of conduct that do not specify
the process or grounds for appeal may unconstitutionally leave residents without due process
and subject to arbitrary and unfair evictions.263 Considering the utter dearth of rights for
individuals in homeless shelters, it is not entirely surprising that encampment codes of conduct
do not contain many meaningful legal protections for residents. 264 But given the unique
dynamic of authorized encampments run by self-organized individuals, this gap could be an
opportunity for advocates in the homeless community to push for some major developments
in legal rights for homeless people.
Codes of conduct could create binding legal rights and obligations and should be
drafted carefully to establish clear expectations. While most codes of conduct nominally
provide for rights to appeal, few adequately describe the process to appeal decisions for
individuals accused of violating the agreement.265 Unclear or inconsistent appeals processes
could raise significant due process issues, a complex topic not yet tested in a court of law.
Similarly, “insurance payments”266 or monthly dues267 could constitute consideration, making
contracts that require them enforceable in a court of law. Neither has this issue been tested in
court yet, but it could create another avenue to ensure stronger rights for encampment
residents.
Because encampments themselves are not typically considered legally cognizable
entities, encampment operators should be conscious of how they respect the rights of
individual residents. People experiencing homelessness have the same rights as housed people
but are not always treated as such. Encampment operators should make rules and procedures
clear and accessible to residents to ensure that everyone’s rights are equally protected.
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IV. Messaging & Social Issues
Any city planning to open an authorized encampment should be prepared to answer
many questions and concerns posed by the public and other stakeholders. City ordinances can
even require operating partners to set up community outreach efforts and mechanisms for
public input throughout operating the encampment.268 Cities should anticipate the most
common concerns and be prepared to dispel
misconceptions and to emphasize the benefits of
permitted encampments. Sometimes, it may be
Anticipate the most
more effective to provide information about how a
common concerns, be
city or host intends to respond to specific concerns
prepared to dispel
should they come to fruition, rather than to persuade
misconceptions, and
every dissenter of an encampment’s merits.

emphasize the benefits of

Most importantly, cities implementing
permitted encampments.
authorized encampments must acknowledge what
the encampment can and cannot do with candor.
Most—if not all—authorized encampments replicate at least some of the barriers to existing
shelters by virtue of limited space and rules in place to protect the residents and the
surrounding community. This reality means that sanctioning encampments may respond to
part of the problem with emergency shelters (not enough beds for the number of people
experiencing homelessness), but they do little to address other functional barriers to shelter,
let alone the underlying causes of homelessness. Cities should be forthright in their
communications about the sanctioned encampment and careful not to overstate its role as an
interim solution to homelessness. Sanctioned encampments are a "critical interim measure" to
ensure that unhoused people have " a safe and stable place to live," but they should not be the
solution to a larger housing crisis, nor should their existence be used "to enable complacency
or increased criminalization of houseless folks who do not or cannot access a sanctioned
encampment."269

A. Public Health & Public Safety
First, uninformed housed people worry about the public health and safety risks posed
by homeless encampments. However, encampments have been shown not to create health
and safety problems, even partially resolving those issues sometimes.270 Yet, many people
mistakenly associate people experiencing homelessness with crime and disease, and any
hosting entity should be prepared to head off those concerns.
For example, one night, while Seattle University was hosting Tent City 3, there was an
altercation between some unhoused people on the far side of campus.271 The fight took place
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around three in the morning, and the police were called because of a knife injury.272 The
individuals involved had no relationship to TC3, but were homeless.273 News coverage of the
fight the next day mentioned that SU was hosting a homeless encampment, as though that
information was relevant because of the unhoused status of the individuals and the proximity
to university property (though located centrally in a major urban area).274 Representatives from
SU spent the day calling news stations, asking them to stop bringing up the encampment in
the coverage of the fight because one actually had nothing to do with the other, but
mentioning the encampment in the same news segment suggested a connection.275
One of the notable restrictions on encampment residency is a zero-tolerance policy for
individuals with histories as sex offenders. Many authorized encampments ask whether
individuals are on sex offender registries as part of their screening questions and do not allow
anyone who says ‘yes’ to join the encampment. Similarly, authorized encampments also
include sobriety policies, prohibiting any use of drugs or alcohol on site, and making violation
an eviction-worthy event. These restrictions can assuage some of the public health and safety
concerns expressed by housed neighbors, especially in the university context. Yet, it is also
worth noting this exclusionary policy means that people who face some of the most significant
barriers to housing (including emergency shelters and other transitional housing spaces) are
also excluded from the authorized encampment environment.276
Finally, the Seattle Police Department collected data about the frequency of crimes
committed in the areas around authorized encampments in that city, which shows “no
significant increase in crime” because of the
encampment.277 The City of Seattle even suggested
There has been “no
that the increased traffic of unhoused people in a
significant increase in crime”
neighborhood hosting an encampment may be the
because of authorized
source of negative perceptions but noted that further
277
encampments.
study is necessary to understand the impact of
increased foot traffic.278

B. Stability & Efficiency
Cities should also emphasize the potential for effective service delivery via
encampments, given that existing alternatives have been insufficient to rehouse many people
in the community. Caring for people experiencing homelessness is costly—from shelter
operations to sweeps279 and unpaid medical bills. Authorized encampments pose opportunities
272
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to care for people’s basic needs more efficiently, reducing the costs of policing and medical
care for unhoused people. Centralizing a group of people with some common social service
needs can allow social service providers to meet with clients more regularly.
Further, the mere fact of a stable living arrangement can improve a person’s ability to
address issues that contribute to homelessness—like loss of income, mental health challenges,
chemical dependency, or physical illness—and transition back into housing. Cities should
respond to concerns that permitting homeless encampments enables people to remain
unhoused should clarify the existing barriers to shelter and transitional housing and emphasize
how permitted encampments can serve the same purposes as shelters by providing stable
living environments where people experiencing homelessness can effectively access the
services they need to become housed again.

C. Pedagogical Opportunities
Universities that host homeless
encampments should underscore the unique
pedagogical opportunities that encampments
provide for the collegiate community. If
encampment residents desire and support
working with students, the encampment
environment can offer a microcosm of servicelearning opportunities. From socio-economical
determinants to health to practical applications
for dental students and law students studying
public benefits, residents’ needs present valuable Photo: Seattle Pacific University280
learning opportunities for students at universities
that host encampments. Perhaps most important, direct interaction with people experiencing
homelessness can have a transformative effect on students, breaking down stereotypes and
inspiring students to become compassionate citizens. In this way, hosting homeless
encampments can support universities’ values and missions around community engagement
and religious or moral responsibilities.280
However, universities should be careful that their pedagogical activities do not cross
the line into appropriating the experiences of unhoused people. “[O]verly stud[ying]” residents
can detract from the community-building objectives of hosting an encampment by
dehumanizing residents and subjecting them to invasive questioning.281 Universities should
work closely with the encampment when planning courses around hosting, so boundaries are
clear and encampment residents are not subjected to more pedagogical engagement than
they are comfortable with. Universities should also be mindful that individual residents’
feelings may change during the stay and should respect their wishes for more privacy.
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D. Continuing Efforts for Permanent Solutions to Homelessness
Finally, all messaging around encampments should
clarify that permitted encampments are not themselves a
solution to homelessness. While some individuals may prefer
living in encampments long-term, conditions can still be harsh
and volatile sometimes. Cities that cannot provide for a
sizeable number of homeless people through shelters and
other traditional rehousing options must understand that
sanctioned encampments are not sustainable options for many people. Authorized
encampments are best understood as interim solutions to improve the immediate conditions
of people experiencing homelessness while the particular city invests in and develops
permanent solutions like low-income housing, transitional housing, mental health services,
affordable healthcare, supervised consumption sites, low-barrier employment opportunities,
or all of the above.

Permitted
encampments are not
themselves a solution
to homelessness.
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CONCLUSION
Authorized encampments can be effective interim solutions to homelessness in
communities where traditional shelters options are inadequate to meet the needs of people
experiencing homelessness. However, cities implementing permitted encampments should be
aware of the critical opportunities and challenges encampments present, and they should
carefully consider how they plan to address the most significant issues relevant to the locality.
There are five recommendations for how to approach created a successful sanctioned
encampment program:
1. Start with Research. Many communities are experimenting with sanctioned
encampments in response to the quickly intensifying homelessness crisis. Cities
considering implementing authorized encampments should look to those who came
before for insights, rather than reinventing the wheel.
2. Identify Goals. These goals must be more specific than “ending homelessness.” Is the
goal of the encampment to respond to a specific health crisis, so speed is more
important than developing sustainable self-governance? Is creating an intentional
community important, so residents should be allowed to stay for longer periods and
develop skills that could transfer to income-generating work? Or is the goal simply to
improve the immediate conditions of people experiencing homelessness while more
shelter and transitional housing is built? The fundamental purpose of the encampment
will inform how to measure its success, and how to approach operations, legal
obligations, and messaging. Decide on the objectives of the encampments from the
outset and build evaluation metrics that reflect those goals.
3. Be Realistic. The goals identified under the previous recommendation must be
realistic. If the goal is for the encampment to serve as a stopover point to more
specialized interventions, the city must be realistic about how long it will take for each
person to access and transition into the next steps. Cities must also acknowledge the
reality that not every person experiencing homelessness can access encampments—
space limitations, sobriety requirements, and zero-tolerance policies for people with
criminal histories can functionally exclude people just as shelters often do. Cities need
understand the limits of encampments and not punish the remaining unhoused people
for whom permitted encampments are not a viable option. Relatedly, cities and
operators should be careful not to oversell the merits of sanctioned encampments to
themselves and to other stakeholders; the existence of permitted encampments should
not enable complacency.
4. Set and Follow Clear Expectations. Powers, rights, and duties regarding governance
and enforcement in the encampment should be exceedingly clear to all involved.
Operators should develop straightforward rules and regulations and follow them
consistently. Similarly, roles should be delineated between governing bodies, service
providers, and resident security forces, so any issues that arise can be dealt with swiftly,
without causing more confusion or disruption. In the same vein, the neighboring
community should share a clear understanding about the role and operations of the
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encampment, so neighbors can effectively support the successful operation of the
encampment.
5. Genuinely Commit to Community Structure. Whatever governance structure or
overall goals of the encampment, all parties involved must genuinely commit to and
respect the objectives of the encampment. Any alterations to rules or regulations
should be in service to the encampment’s mission to maintain the integrity of the
project.
Each recommendation is vital to the success of any model of sanctioned encampment. But
most important, parties implementing authorized encampments must do so thoughtfully, with
clarity, and with genuine input from the residents of the encampment and the surrounding
community.
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City of Seattle Permitted Encampment Evaluation, June 28, 2017
Contract Between Tent City 3 & Seattle Pacific University
Seattle Pacific University Letter to Parents
Seattle Pacific University Letter to Students
Contract Between Tent City 3 & University of Washington
TC3@UW Evaluation Report, Winter 2017
Dignity Village Entrance Agreement
Contract Between Dignity Village & City of Portland, Oregon
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